

Approved For Release 2009/08/27 : CIA-RDP85M00158R000500070009-3

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: <i>ICS/Registry</i>		<i>3/28</i>
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
FROM: <i>Secom</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

CONFIDENTIAL

31 MAR 1983
31 MAR 1983DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

cmte-18

LOGGED

SECOM-D-072

28 March 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM: [redacted]

25X1

Chairman

SUBJECT: Computer Security Work Statement and Management Plan [redacted]

25X1

1. Your 23 March note and the attachments to it provided me new insights on the computer security issue. The following is based on those insights and upon my 25 March conversation with [redacted]

25X1

2. The plan is ambitious, but if it delivers it should clear the way for meaningful policy on computer security. Therefore, I will instruct the Chairman, Computer Security Subcommittee, to place on the back burner further efforts to revise DCID 1/16, pending the outcome of [redacted] efforts. I agreed with [redacted] that it would be helpful to have [redacted] the DIA officer who chairs our Computer Security Subcommittee, participate in the [redacted], and requested that the SECOM staff be kept appropriately

25X1

25X1

25X1

informed of [redacted] progress. I hope the [redacted] project will be successful in determining what needs to be done to implement a meaningful, effective computer security program in the Intelligence Community. Among the things that must be sorted out are the roles of the various disciplines involved -- emanations and cryptographic security (TEMPEST and COMSEC), and the procedural and information control aspects (e.g., Third Agency Rule, ORCON) heretofore under the DCI's authority for intelligence information. It would be helpful if broad information-handling issues which transcend automated systems could be addressed at an early stage of the study so as to clarify the nature of the model system to be protected by the recommended policy. The only serious concern I have about the [redacted] blueprint is the possible erosion of DCI authority that might result from entering into an agreement with DoD and becoming one among many participants in making policy for protecting sensitive intelligence in the automated mode. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

3. My acceptance of the services of [redacted] until November 1983 was predicated upon his potential as a computer expert to assist with the revision of DCID 1/16. With that effort now in drydock, I find there is no significant mission for [redacted] in the SECOM Staff. His computer expertise far overshadows his security capabilities, and I cannot consider him an appropriate representative of the Security Committee to other activities. [redacted] advises me that [redacted] is a major part of the 2.5 man-years of support he has promised [redacted]. Therefore, [redacted] soon

25X1

25X1

25X1

CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

will not be available to perform any functions for SECOM. Logistically, SECOM does not have appropriate office space for [redacted], an inconvenience that becomes illogical under current circumstances. I respectfully suggest, therefore, that [redacted] would more properly be assigned to the Policy & Planning Staff or to the Information Handling Committee, which also has drafted a plan calling for support from Mr. [redacted]

25X1

4. Finally, I would like to offer whatever assistance the Security Committee, its subcommittees and the staff may be able to provide to the success of [redacted]

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL